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NOTE
JOINDER OF MOTOR VEHICLE LIABILITY INSURANCE
COMPANIES WITH THE INSURED IN TORT CASES-UNDER
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW WHEN CAN THEY BE JOINED?
Scopj
In this reasonably narrow vista of procedural law there still exists
some confusion as to when it is permissible to join a tort-feasor's in-
surer in an action by the injured party for personal injury or prop-
erty damage.' To some degree this uncertainty has resulted from:
(1) the type of insurance contract involved, i. e., insurance (indem-
nity against liability) or indemnity (indemnity against loss) ;2 (2)
the effect thereon of the statute making insurance compulsory, and
(3) the type or types of damages alleged by the plaintiff in his com-
plaint. Also the question of removal to Federal Court has tended
at times to further complicate the pictu'ie. In this note considera-
tion is given to these details, and of necessity almost entirely as
they pertain to situations wherein the tort-feasor involved is a public
carrier, a bus company, a taxicab, or the like. Not discussed are the
problems growing out of the rights of the insurer as subrogee, nor,
to any real extent, are the problems in connection with joinder of
an insurer under a policy of private liability insurance. As is obvi-
ous from the title, only South Carolina law is involved.
GENERAI CONSIDERATIONS
The plaintiff in these situations quite naturally is desirous of join-
ing the reliable and financially responsible insurance company when-
ever possible. Not only is this because of his greater chance of
realizing on his judgment should 'he be successful, but also due to
the plaintiff's increased chances of receiving a jury verdict and a
good one. This latter consideration stems from the element of preju-
dice inevitably a part of every close case and some not so close when
1. As recently as March 1953 the question of proper joinder was raised in
Leppard v. Jordan's Truck Line, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. S.C. 1953). In
this case, properly removed to the Federal Court, the plaintiff moved to remand
the cause to the state courts despite the fact that punitive damages were claimed.
The motion was refused on the ground that the causes of action stated were
separate and as such properly in federal court.
2. "A distinction is made between contracts for indemnity against liability,
and those of indemnity against loss. In the former case the insurer's obligation
becomes fixed when liability attaches to the insured. In the latter case the in-
surer's liability does not attach until loss has been suffered, that is when the
insured has paid the damages." 1 JOYcE, INSURANCE, § 27 b (2d ed.) as quoted
in Piper v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930).
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insurance companies are involved. For essentially the same reasons,
operating in the reverse, of course, the defendant seeks earnestly in
the usual case to defeat joinder.
Under what circumstances joinder is allowed is governed largely
by statute.3 These statutes are discussed in the section immediately
following. In succeeding sections the case law as developed by the
South Carolina Supreme Court is surveyed, along with the slight
variation from South Carolina holdings and interpretations which
apparently exists in connection with federal cases arising in South
Carolina. Special treatment is given to joinder under the relatively
new Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act4 which, it is thought,
leaves room for some doubt as to its effect procedurally on joinder.
Lastly, in the conclusion an attempt is made to summarize the con-
ditions which must exist before joinder of the tort-feasor's insurer
can be accomplished.
STATUTES
The procedure of joining two or more distinct causes of action in
a single pleading originated at common law and was permitted pri-
marily for the purpose of avoiding as far as possible a multiplicity
of suits. 5 Although controlled by the rather strict rule that all counts
joined at common law must be pursued in the same form of action,
where permissible, joinder nonetheless came early to be encouraged.
Now, aided by statute it is even more encouraged. In fact, in Ripley
v. Rodgers6 the South Carolina Supreme Court said "the dominant
idea is to permit joinder of causes of action, legal or equitable, where
there is some substantial unity, and a liberal construction according
to the rules as to remedial laws should be given"!.
7
3. The statutes primarily concerned are found in CODE OF LAWS O SOUTH
CAROLINA 1952:
§ f0-701- What causes of action may be joined (Formerly included in
§ 487 of 1942 Code).
§ 10-702 -Joinder of principal and surety. (Formerly included in § 487,
1942 Code).
§ 58-1481 - Insurance or bond required of certificate holders generally.
(Public service companies).
§ 58-1482 - Insurance required on motor vehicles transporting goods for
hire.
§ 58-1512 - Liability insurance required (taxicabs).
§ 58-1513- Bond in lieu of insurance (Taxicabs).
§ 58-1536 -Right to regulate motor vehicles used for hire (Busses and
Taxies in Cities of 30,000 to 50,000).
4. S. C. AcTs AND JOINT R.SOLUTIONS 1952, No. 723, p. 1853.
5. Martin v. Keith, 214 S.C. 241, 52 S.E. 2d 22 (1949).
6. 213 S.C. 541, 50 S.E. 2d 575 (1948).
7. Id. at 544.
[Vol. 6
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The statute governing joinder of causes, Code of Laws of South
Carolina Sec. 10-701 (i952) reads in part as follows:
The plaintiff may unite in the same complaint several causes
of action, whether they be such as have been heretofore denomi-
nated legal or equitable or both, when they all arise out of:
(1) 'The same transaction or transactions connected with the
same subject of action;
(2) Contract, express or implied;
(3) Injuries with or without force to person and property or
either; . . .
But the causes of action so united must (1) all belong to one
of these classes, (2) except in actions for the foreclosure of mort-
gages, affect all parties to the action, (3) not require different
places of trial and (4) be separately stated.
Under this statute alone quite probably joinder of liability insur-
ance companies with tort-feasors in most cases could have been ac-
complished except, of course, and it has long been so recognized, that
notice to the jury of the existence in the case of insurance against
liability is usually so prejudicial to a defendant that it will ordinarily
be carefully avoided in order that a fair determination of legal fault
may be achieved.
But in 1925 the picture changed. Compulsory insurance made its
entrance into South Carolina. By Act of the Legislature motor ve-
hicle transportation companies were required to procure and main-
tain in force liability and property damage insurance or surety bonds
for the benefit of passengers and the public receiving injury through
the negligence of the transportation company and each motor vehicle
used by them.8 This made a matter of public record the fact that
common carriers were covered by liability insurance. Since the act
was a public act of which every citizen is presumed to have knowl-
edge,9 the jury could not in such case be prejudiced by further
knowledge that the defendant was thus insured.
The way was left open then for joinder if two lesser objections
could be overcome: (1) the joining of a cause of action in tort with
a cause of action in contract, and (2) lack of privity of contract be-
tween the injured plaintiff and the tort-feasor's insurer. Since both
8. Act No. 170 of 1925 as amended by Act 663 of 1928, 34 SrATUTFS AT
LARGE 225. These required automobile transportation companies to procure
liability and property damage insurance or surety bond for the benefit of pas-
senger and public. The requirements for compulsory insurance are now con-
tained in CoDn oF LAWS ov S. C., 1952. § 58-1481, § 58-1482, § 58-1512, § 58-1513,
§ 15-1536.
9. Benn v. Camel City Coach Co., 162 S.C. 44, 160 S.E. 135 (1931).
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actions in motor vehicle liability situations arise from the same trans-
action the first objection can be overcome easily.10 The objection as
to lack of privity of contract is resolved on the premise that the con-
tract between insured and insurer is transformed by the statute re-
quiring insurance 1 from a private agreement to one executed pri-
marily for the benefit of third persons, namely, the injured plaintiff
and the public generally and thus enforceable as a third party bene-
ficiary contract.
12
Three cases 13 followed which generally established the South Caro-
lina law to be such as would permit joinder of the liability insurer
with the tort-feasor for the reasons set forth above. But, it was
pointed out, one injured due to negligence may not join the insurer
as a defendant with the tort-feasor where the elements of damages
claimed are different. Thus was raised the question of joinder where
damages claimed included punitive damages as well as actual damages,
or where actual damages alone were claimed but claimed in an amount
in excess of the policy limits of the compulsory insurance. These
two problems are developed further in the succeeding sections of this
note.
The next major change statutory-wise came in 1935 when accord-
ing to Judge Wyche in Daniel v. Burdette,14 "the Legislature of
South Carolina, obviously for the purpose of preventing the removal
of causes of action like the instant case to the federal court under
the removal statute and decisions construing same, amended section
487; Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1932 . ... ".15 This amend-
ment is now found as a separate section of the 1952 code, Section
10-702, and reads as follows:
When an indemnity bond or insurance is required by law to
be given by a principal for the performance of a contract or as
insurance against personal injury founded upon tort, the prin-
10. Cf. Piper v. American Fidelity & Casualty Company, 157 S.C. 106 (1930)
at 115-117. Also, Ripley v. Rodgers, 213 S.C. 541 (1948) at 544-545 where the
insurance contract was one of indemnity against liability as opposed to indemni-
ty against loss the "same transaction" was construed as the collision which gave
rise to both the plaintiff's action in tort and, as a third party beneficiary, to his
action in contract since liability to him attached under the contract at the instant
of the collision.
11. CODn o LAWS OF S. C. § 15-1481 (1952).
12. The method by which joinder could be reasoned out was first pointed
up in Piper v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106
(1930) but here joinder was not permitted due to claim of punitive damages
as hereinafter discussed.
13. Piper v. American Fidelity and Casualty Co., 157 S. C. 106, 154 S. E. 106
(1930) ; Benn v. Camel City Coach Co., 162 S. C. 44, 160 S.E. 135 (1931);
Thompson v. Bass, 167 S.C. 345, 166 S. E. 346 (1932).
14. 24 F. Supp. 218 (W.D. S.C. 1938), hereinafter discussed.
15. Id. at 220.
(Vol. 6
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cipal and his surety, whether on bond or insurance, may be
joined in the same action and their liability shall be joint and
concurrent.
Apparently the amendment was merely declaratory of existing
law' 6 for so far as this statute related to joinder of parties in the
same action, this principle had already been set out by the South
Carolina Supreme Court in construing the code section relating to
compulsory insurance17 in the Piper, Benn, and Thompson cases.1 s
In 1948 (amended in 1949) the present Section 58-1512, and 58-
1513 were added to clarify the situation regarding compulsory insur-
ance for taxicabs. In 1949 there was added to the code the present
Section 58-1482, providing penalties of fines and imprisonment for
owners of vehicles carrying goods for hire without complying with
the insurance requirements of Public Service Commission set under
the authority of Code Sec. 58-1481. Except for these additions there
were no substantial statutory changes relating to compulsory in-
surance until the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act was
passed in 1952.19
SOUTH CAROLINA CASE LAW
The conditions under which joinder of an insurer with the insured
tort-feasor in an action for damages by an injured party could be
effected first received notice in the South Carolina courts in the case
of Piper v. American Fidelity and Casualty Company.20 Here a bus
of the defendant Columbia Bus Company collided with the automo-
bile of the plaintiff. Piper brought his action in the Court of Com-
mon Pleas of Richland County. He claimed $25,000 actual and
punitive damages alleging negligent, wilful and wanton operation of
the bus. The American Fidelity and Casualty Company was joined
as a defendant in its capacity as insurer of the bus company on a
contract of insurance required by statute to be in force and on file
with the Public Service Commission. But the policy limit was $5,000
and the risk insured against was negligence, not wantoness, nor wil-
fulness.
Overruling the demurrer of the defendant insurance company, the
trial judge held that there was no misjoinder due to the fact that
the two causes of action, one in tort and the other in contract, arose
16. Id. at 221.
17. CODM OF LAWS ov S. C. § 10-1481 (1952).
18. See note 13 supra.
19. S. C. AcTs AND JOINT RSOLuTTIONS 1952, No. 723, p. 1853.
20. 157 S.C. 106, 154 S.E. 106 (1930).
1954] NOT
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out the same transaction or transactions21 and that the requirement
of contract between the injured plaintiff and the insurer defendant
was resolved by Code of Civ. Procedure, 1922, Section 430, Sub-
section 122 which had the effect of giving the injured party a bene-
ficial interest in the insurance contract and'thus a cause of action in
contract.
The lower court, however, had overlooked one point, punitive
damages, and this was sufficient for a partial reversal. The Su-
preme Court on appeal held that there could be no joinder in this
situation without amending the original complaint since punitive dam-
ages had been alleged. Mr. Justice Cothran in the opinion stated:
The plaintiff under the Jumbling Act . . . [Code of Laws
of S. C., Sec. 10-702 (1952)] . .., on the tort side of his case
against the bus company has alleged two distinct causes of ac-
tion, one for actual damages based upon the negligence of the
bus company and one for actual and punitive damages based upon
the wilful, wanton, and malicious act of the bus company, for
an aggregate amount of $25,000 damages; on the contract side
of his case he has alleged a single cause of action based upon
the policy of insurance to the extent of the amount of the policy,
$5,000, and could recover from it only such actual damages as
may have resulted from the negligence of the bus company.
It seems clear that, as to so much of the plaintiff's cause of
action as was based upon the negligence of the bus company,
the plaintiff is necessarily limited to the amount of the policy,
and the excess up to the amount sued for, $25,000, does not at
all "affect" the insurance company.
It seems equally clear that the insurance company under the
Statute and under the contract of insurance was liable only for
such damages as resulted from the negligence of the insured; it
was not at all concerned in the plaintiff's cause of action for puni-
tive damages, and was not therefore "affected" in the slightest
degree thereby.
2 3
The Piper case showed the way for joinder. It was followed in-
1931 by Benn v. Camel City Coach Co.24 where joinder was held
proper, the claim for damages being (on amendment of the complaint)
for actual damages only and in amount not in excess of the policy-
21. CODX OF LAws oF S. C. § 10-701 (1952).
22. COD4 OF LAws O' S. C. § 58-1481 (1952).
23. 157 S.C. 106, 117 (1930).
24. 162 S.C. 44, 160 S.E. 135 (1931).
[Vol. 6
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limit, and in 1932 by Thompson v. Bass2 5 where again under similar
circumstances the joinder of the insurer as a defendant with the
tort-feasor common carrier was held proper.
In both the Benn case and the Thompson case the doctrine of the
Piper case was cited with approval and considered as controlling. In
addition in the Thompson case the court clarified another point by
holding that the contract of insurance involved "carried with it the
Statute of the State, makes it part of it"26 and despite a contract pro-
vision to the contrary the contract was one to indemnify against lia-
bility and not one to indemnify against loss.
It was at this point that the Legislature acted amending Section
487 of the 1932 Code by adding what is now Section 10-702 Code
of Laws of S. C. (1952).27 This was the amendment which Judge
Wyche said in Daniel v. Burdette28 added nothing new as far as
joinder was concerned but was only declaratory of the law previous-
ly delineated in the Piper, Benn and Thompson cases.
2 9
Then came a series of cases further amplifying the established law.
Miles v. Thrower30 held that even where the statute provides for
joinder of separate causes of action in one suit they must be stated
separately in the complaint. But this question as to the form of the
complaint was again before the court in Holder v. HaynesA1 the hold-
ing there being clearly that the plaintiff is not required to state sepa-
rately the various causes of action set out in the complaint. Thus
was overruled the contrary holding in the Miles case which quite pos-
sibly was decided without consideration of the 1935 amendment to
the joinder statute as no mention of it was made. In Andrews v.
PooleS2 the text of the decision deceptively pointed toward joinder in
cases of privately owned vehicles as well as common carriers, but it
was held from the facts only that joinder was proper where a common
carrier was involved since the defendant was in fact a common carrier
doing business as "Poole's Transportation". Cox v. Employer's
Liability Assurance Corp.3 3 repudiated the apparent holding in An-
drews case, supra, as to privately owned vehicles and held:
... one who alleges injury due to the negligent operation of a
motor vehicle which is privately owned and privately used, and
25. 167 S.C. 345, 166 S.E. 346 (1932).
26. Id. at 349, 350.
27. See text reference of note 14, supra.
28. See note 14 supra.
29. See note 13 supra.
30. 181 S.C. 392, 187 S.R. 818 (1936).
31. 193 S. C. 176, 7 S.E. 2d 833 (1940).
32. 182 S.C. 206, 188 S.E. 860 (1936).
33. 191 S.C. 233, 196 S.E. 549 (1938).
1954]
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not used as a common carrier, may not unite in his complaint a
cause of action in tort against the owner and operator of the
motor vehicle with a cause of action on a contract of liability
insurance carried by the owner of the motor vehicle.
34
Joinder of the insurer with the insured tort-feasor in the case of an
action by the injured party against the owner of a private vehicle
is prohibited on the theory that the injured party has no original
right to proceed against the insurer, the latter's liability being only
to absolve the insured from loss and not such as to be joint and con-
current with the liability of the tort-feasor. Then came Holder v.
Haynes,3 5 holding that an insurer although properly joined under
the statute cannot be held liable where the insured employer cannot
be held due to the fact that the negligent act was committed by an
employee acting entirely outside of the scope of his employment.
Bryant v. Blue Bird Cab Co.,36 relying on the Piper and Benn cases,
held that joinder was proper even though the words of the insurance
contract purported it to be one of indemnity rather than one of in-
surance.
Another step forward was made in clarifying the situation by
Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co.3 7 Until that point no action had
been brought and joinder allowed wherein damages claimed exceed-
ed the policy limits of the liability insurance. This was probably
due to the decision in the Piper case which indicated that the safest
course for plaintiff to pursue to join successfully the all important
defendant insurer was to keep his claim for damages within the
policy limits and completely free of all indication of punitive damages.
In the instant case in an opinion by Mr. Justice Stukes the court
held the joinder proper where damages claimed were actual damages
although the amount of the damages claimed was $25,000 as compared
to liability policy limitation of $5,000. Said the Court:
The result of the circuit decision ... runs afoul of the well-
known intention of the Code to simplify actions and procedure,
because it would necessitate appellant bringing separate suits
upon causes which . . . may be properly joined against the de-
fendants. ...
It will be easy and simple for the trial Judge of the case to
instruct the jury, if the evidence substantiates the allegations of
the complaint, that the casualty company's liability is limited
34. Id. at 235, 236.
35. See note 31 supra.
36. 202 S.C. 456, 25 S.E. 2d 489 (1943).
37. 203 S.C. 121, 26 S.E. 2d 406 (1943).
[Vol. 6
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by the terms of its policy, whereas the carrier's liability is
limited only by the amount of damages alleged and proof there-
upon.38
The Daniel case was followed and cited with approval in Kelly v.
Driggers39 and Scott v. Wells. 40 In the Scott case the lower
court was reversed due to the fact that the judge failed to charge in
accordance with the rule of Daniel v. Tower Trucking Co.4 1 The
Court said:
It is as surely prejudicial to a defendant to introduce into
the trial the element of insurance, where permissible as here,
and withhold from the jury knowledge of the limit of such in-
surance as it is to introduce it at all where it is not permissible.
It may be said with logic that the prejudice begins in the latter
case at zero and in the former, using the figure applicable to
the case in hand, it begins at $5,000. Rarely can the applicability
of judicial reasoning be defined with such mathematical preci-
sion.
42
After the Daniel case came Massey v. War Emergency Co-Opera-
tive Ass'n.43 In an action by his administratrix for the wrongful
death of Oscar Massey, American Fidelity and Casualty Company was
joined under allegations that it was surety upon two statutory poli-
cies of liability insurance carried by its co-defendant, one pursuant
to state statute and the other pursuant to the Motor Carrier Act
of the United States of 1935.44 There were demurrers and mo-
tions to state the causes of action separately by both defendants.
These were denied. But a motion to strike that portion of the com-
plaint concerned with the federal statute was granted by Circuit
Court Judge Sease. This action was affirmed by the Supreme Court
which took judicial notice of the rules of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Motor Carrier Act. The Court pointed out that
this act differs from the South Carolina law45 in that under the
federal act the policy shall be conditioned to pay within the amount
of the policy of insurance any final judgment recovered against such
motor carrier, and in effect is a policy to indemnify against loss
38. Id. at 124.
39. 214 S.C. 237, 51 S.E. 764 (1949).
40. 214 S.C. 511, 53 S.E. 2d 400 (1949).
41. See note 37 supra.
42. 214 S.C. 511, 516 (1949).
43. 209 S.C. 292, 39 S.E. 2d 907 (1946). See also companion case, Lawter
v. War Emergency Co-operative Ass'n., 213 S.C. 286, 49 S.E. 2d 227 (1948).
44. 49 USCA 315.
45. Now CODE OF LAWS OV S. C. § 58-1481 (1952).
1954] NonE
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rather than one indemnifying against liability. The South Carolina
law on the other hand requires that the policy issued shall insure or
indemnify the public receiving personal injury by reason of any act
of negligence in such amounts as the Public Service Commission may
determine and in effect is one of indemnity against liability.4 6 The
court held that federal rules applied and joinder could not be had
in this action upon the policy posted with the Interstate Commerce
Commission despite the fact that joinder was proper on the policy
posted with the South Carolina Public Service Commission.
The situs of the injury or damage sometimes causes difficulty. In
Mobley v. Bland and Pennsylvania Casualty Conmpany47 a South
Carolina plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle collision in North
Carolina. Mobley attached one of defendant Bland's trucks when
it entered Dillon County, South Carolina, and instituted this action.
Bland was a resident of Georgia but submitted to the jurisdiction of
the South Carolina court. The defendant insurer challenged the join-
der on jurisdictional grounds. The Circuit Court ruled the joinder
proper but the Supreme Court disagreed holding that the causes of ac-
tion arose out of an accident occurring in North Carolina and there-
fore must be tried in accordance with North Carolina law. Since a
North Carolina statute prohibited the joinder, the Pennsylvania Casu-
alty Company was improperly joined. In Craft v. Hall48 joinder of the
insurer with insured taxicab operator was held proper even though
the accident giving rise to the action occurred outside of the city
limits of the City of Orangeburg. It was held that the city ordinance
making the carrying of liability insurance compulsory, pursuant to
which the defendants entered into the present contract of insurance,
clearly contemplated operation outside the city limits. Likewise, the
policy itself contemplated operations outside the city providing for
coverage for liability for damages occurring in the city and in an
area of ten-mile radius. The accident occurred about three miles from
the city.
Other recent South Carolina cases49 present some variations but
offer no real departure from the rule derived originally from the
Piper decision and developed as outlined above. One case, however,
is interesting in that it points up again the uniform fear of prejudice
46. 209 S.C. 292 (1946). The rules of the South Carolina Public Service
Commission fixed the limits of the liability insurance required at $5,000 as to
injury to any one person in any one accident.
47. 200 S.C. 448, 21 S.E. 2d 22 (1942). See also case cited note 1 supra.
48. 208 S.C. 187, 37 S.E. 2d 537 (1946).
49. McIntosh v. Whieldon, 205 S. C. 119, 30 S.E. 2d 851 (1943); Piedmont
Fire Ins. Co. v. Burlington Truckers, 205 S.C. 489, 32 S.E. 2d 755 (1944);
Pringle v. Atlantic Coast Line Rvy. Co., 212 -S.C. 343, 47 S.E. 2d 722 (1948).
[Vol. 6
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which immediately enters the picture when it is revealed or suspected
that the defendant is covered by liability insurance. In McCrae v.
McCoy,50 the insurer was originally joined but was dismissed when
found to be insolvent. Defendant McCoy sought in vain to intro-
duce into evidence the original pleading to show why the insurer was
no longer a party and that he, McCoy, stood alone. The verdict and
judgment went against McCoy. He appealed contending that the
evidence should have been allowed, not so much to decrease his lia-
bility "but to remove from the mind of the jury the illusory image
of a giant pot of gold from which they might bring forth a portion
for the admittedly unfortunate plaintiff".5 ' However, the Supreme
Court agreed with the Circuit Court as to the exclusion of any men-
tion of the insurer on the principle that the solvency or insolvency
of the insurance company could not affect the amount of damages
suffered by the plaintiff and therefore the matter was irrelevant.
FEDERAL CASES ARISING IN SOUTH CAROLINA
Federal courts were apparently first confronted with the question
of joinder of an insurer with his insured tort-feasor in cases aris-
ing in South Carolina in 1938 when District Court Judge Wyche
decided Daniel v. Burdette.52  This was subsequent to the passage
of the amendment to the statute permitting joinder. 53 Here was an
action for wrongful death. It had been removed to the federal court
by the defendant insurance company which the plaintiff had joined in
his action against Burdette, the owner of one of the vehicles in the
collision. The question before the court was whether or not to re-
mand the cause to the state court. The court in denying the motion
to remand held that since punitive damages were claimed, under the
doctrine of the Piper case both defendants were not affected by both
causes of action and therefore these causes of action were separable
and properly removed to federal court. Judge Wyche had this to say:
• . . The fact that under the state statute plaintiff has a right
to unite the causes of action in a single suit is not alone suffici-
ent to affect the right granted to the defendant insurance com-
pany by the laws of the United States to remove the controversy
to the federal court. 28 USCA Sec. 71,54 Hilton v. Southern
50. 214 S.C. 343, 52 S.E. 2d 403 (1949).
51. Id. at 348.
52. 24 F. Supp. 218 (W.D. S.C. 1938). Not to be confused with Daniel v.
Tower Trucking Co., 203 S.C. 121, 26 S.E. 2d 406 (1943). See text reference
note 37 supra.
53. CODR ov LAws or S. C. § 10-702 (1952). See text reference note 15 supra.
54. Now 28 USCA 1441.
1954] NoT:
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Railway Co., (D.C.S.C. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 17. Had the plain-
tiff limited her demand against Burdette to the insurance policy
limits, and for negligence only, the case would unquestionably
not be removable, because the amended statute in such event
would make the cause of action joint and concurrent. But where
the plaintiff seeks to recover from the insured defendant a greater
sum of money than the policy limits and for wilfulness, the
causes of action do not affect all parties, and in this respect, fall
short of the statutory requirements.5 5
In Behling v. Rivers5 6 a 1946 case, Judge Waring cited Daniel v.
Burdette with approval. This case from a factual point of view was
similar to the Daniel case except involved here was a claim for actual
damages only and in an amount not in excess of the policy limitations.
The court accordingly held that a separate controversy was not stated,
that a joint action was stated, and remanded it to the state court.
Judge Waring summarized the law of South Carolina on the subject
of joinder of liability insurer with the insured in tort cases as follows:
From these cases and a number of others more recently de-
cided we may summarize the law of South Carolina to be that
where one has a cause of action for personal injuries against a
carrier for hire (but not against a private conveyance) which is
required by State statute to furnish liability insurance, that such
insurance is for the benefit of the general public, including the
person injured, and having been entered into before and issued
for the purpose of indemnifying any such person, such injured
person has an interest in the policy and can bring suit directly
against the insurance company and under the provisions of the
Code (hereinabove cited) such action may be brought jointly
against the owner and the insurance company and is to be con-
sidered as a joint action. However, this is limited to the amount
of the insurance and to actual damages sustained, and such a
joint suit may not be maintained if punitive damages are claimed,
or where the amount claimed is larger than the amount of the
insurance.5 7
Although it made no difference as to the outcome of the instant
case, apparently Judge Waring overlooked Daniel v. Tower Truck-
ing Co.,58 decided some three and a half years before and which al-
55. Daniel v. Burdette, 24 F. Supp. 218, 221 (W.D. S.C. 1938).
56. 74 F. Supp. 350 (E.D. S.C. 1946).
57. Id. at 352.
58. 203 S.C. 121, 26 S.E. 2d 406 (1943). See text reference note 37 supra.
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lowed joinder where $25,000 actual damages were claimed although
the policy limit of the insurance involved was only $5,000, for the
Judge made no mention of that case in his summary set out above.
The South Carolina case was decided subsequently to Daniel v. Buer-
dette59 yet it is on the law of this latter case that Judge Waring relied.
As the procedural law of the federal court appears from these
two cases, having subsequently not been modified, a plaintiff joining
an insurer with his insured in compulsory insurance situations where
only actual damages are claimed, but claimed in an amount in excess
of the policy limits, runs the risk of having the controversy removed
to federal court, provided, of course, the diversity of citizenship and
jurisdictional amount requirements are also met. This premise is
based on the Daniel v. Burdette holding and the subsequent holding
of the Behling case in which latter opinion the court apparently
failed to avail itself of the procedural refinement of the Daniel v.
Tower Trucking Co. case as to situations where actual damages only
are claimed but in an amount in excess of policy limits.
JOINDER UNDER THE MOTOR-VEHICLE SAFETY RESPONSIBILITY AcT
Briefly, the Motor-Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act of 195260
provides for a deposit of proof of financial responsibility by persons
involved in most automobile accidents and in the more serious traffic
violations. Proof of financial responsibility includes liability insur-
ance policies, surety bonds, or deposits of cash. In two principal
situations proof of financial responsibility is required, both of which
have to do with the operation of motor-vehicles. Noncompliance
with the Act in this respect will bring down on the individuals in-
volved suspension or revocation of drivers' licenses and in some cases
also revocation of automobile registration.
The first of these principal situations arises when proof of finan-
cial responsibility is required from a party involved in an automobile
accident which resulted in death, bodily injury, or damage to proper-
ty of any one person in excess of fifty dollars. The second involves
situations where proof of financial responsibility for the future is
required of persons upon certain convictions. Where a conviction
leads to suspension or revocation of the offender's driver's license
he will also lose his automobile registration. Neither of these can be
reinstated until the offender has posted proof of financial responsi-
bility. And he must thereafter maintain this proof of financial re-
sponsibility for at least three years. In other words where, because
59. See note 14 supra.
60. S. C. ACTS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS 1952, No. 723, p. 1853.
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of a conviction, a driver's license and automobile registration are
revoked, the posting of liability insurance, surety bond, or cash de-
posit is a condition precedent to this individual's subsequent use of
the highways.
The Act became effective January 1, 1953, and under this Act there
have as yet been no decisions from the South Carolina Supreme Court
on the point of joinder of the insurer with the insured in tort action.
However, in view of the already decided law on the point interpret-
ing the previously existing statutes concerning compulsory insur-
ance and in view of certain specific provisions of the Act itself, it
would seem that joinder should not be proper in the case of the first
situation above, and probably not easily accomplished in the second.
Common carriers are not involved here but only private citizens
and privately owned and operated automobiles covered by private
liability insurance. The decision in Cox v. Employer's Liability As-
surance Corporation6 ' was to the effect that insurers of private indi-
viduals could not be joined on the theory that there was no original
right to proceed against the insurer whose liability was only to ab-
solve the insured from loss. The contract of insurance was interpret-
ed as being one of indemnity against loss rather than indemnity
against liability. Earlier it had been held that where liability insur-
ance was compelled by statute, in construing the insurance contract
issued pursuant thereto, the statute must be read into it as a part
of the contract. 62 Also, where the contract read as if it were a policy
indemnifying against loss rather than against liability (in an effort
to preclude the injured party from an original right to proceed against
the insurer) the contract would nonetheless be construed in light of
the purpose of the statute, determined to be one indemnifying against
liability, and the injured party deemed to have a beneficial interest
therein. 63
In the first of the principal situations outlined above, although the
wording of Section 964 of the Act might be argued to make for a
contract for the benefit of the injured party and thus provide the
necessary privity of contract between injured and insurer, the word-
ing of Section 1065 clearly shows a legislative intention to make any
policy of insurance or surety bond posted pursuant to this portion
of the Act, a contract to indemnify against loss rather than one to
61. 191 S.C. 233, 196 S.E. 549 (1938).
62. Thompson v. Bass, 167 S. C. 345, 349. See text reference note 26 supra.
63. Bryant v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 202 S.C. 456, 25 S.E. 2d 489 (1943). See
text reference note 36 supra.
64. S. C. Ac'Ts AND JoINT RrsorurIoNs 1952, No. 723, § 10, p. 1859.
65. Ibid.
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indemnify against liability. In addition, as to the security posted
under this portion of the Act, Section 1166 specifically prohibits any
reference to it in any way at the trial of any action at law to recover
damages. It therefore appears that joinder in this first situation
would be improper.
In the second situation where under the Act proof of financial
responsibility for the future is required, a somewhat different situa-
tion is presented. As described above this proof may consist of a
liability insurance policy, a surety bond or a deposit of cash. Where
cash is deposited there is, of course, no problem of joinder. If a
surety bond is posted, Section 24(b) 67 sets out the procedure as to
action to be taken against the surety and provides for a sixty day
period after the judgment has become final against the principal
before there can be commenced any action on the bond or any pro-
ceeding to foreclose any lien on real estate scheduled by the surety.
From this it can be seen that where a surety bond is posted no joinder
is feasible.
However, under this second portion of the Act when the proof of
financial responsibility consists of a liability insurance policy, the situ-
ation is more favorable to joinder. There is no similar specific
prohibition against the reference in a proceeding at law to the securi-
ty filed under this portion of the Act as there is in Section 11 with
respect to security posted following an accident, our first principal
situation. Also, here the required contract is clearly specified as one
of indemnity against liability. In fact, Section 21 (f) of the Act stipu-
lates that the "liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the
insurance required by this act shall become absolute whenever injury
or damage occurs". 68 The same section goes on to set out that "the
satisfaction by the insured of a judgment for the injury or damage
shall not be a condition precedent to the right or duty of the insur-
ance carrier to make payment on account of the injury or damage". 69
It would seem that joinder could be successful only in this latter
situation, where the proof of financial responsibility for the future
is posted in the form of liability insurance, and in no other situation
arising under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. In this
connection refer again to Code Section 10-702 which reads in part:
"When ... insurance is required by law ... as insurance against
personal injury founded on tort.. . the principal and his surety...
66. Id. at 1860.
67. Id. at 1868, 1869.
68. Id. at 1866.
69. Id. at 1867.
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may be joined in the same action and their liability shall be joint and
concurrent".
70
Despite the fact it may appear that technically joinder could be
had in the particular circumstance set out above, it is difficult to
conceive of so inconsistent a holding as to the Act as a whole. The
Act undoubtedly was intended primarily to benefit the innocent third
party, the injured citizen, but joinder, or at least the well known
jury prejudice against an insurer, was apparently not too far from
the legislative mind when the Act was made law. Although these
provisions do not apply to the entire Act, prohibitions against use of
reports of or, for that matter, any mention of the security posted are
specific, and procedures for measures to be taken against the insurer
or surety should a judgment be uncollectible are clearly set out. With
regard to the relative positioning of the various sections and on a
strict interpretation of the wording of the statute, in the one situation
outlined, joinder may be permitted. However, the surer prediction
is that the Act will be construed as a whole and under it no joinder
allowed in any circumstance.
CONCLUSION
From a legislative point of view there appears an inclination to-
ward additional forms of compulsory liability insurance. The pas-
sage of the Motor-Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act is one recent
indication of this tendency. If this premise proves correct quite
possibly there shall be available in the future additional situations
wherein it will be determined proper to join a tort-feasor's insurer.
As the law stands today, however, joinder of motor vehicle liability
insurance companies with the insured in tort cases apparently is
permitted under South Carolina law only when all of the following
conditions are fulfilled: (1) the insured tort-feasor is one required
by statute to provide liability insurance; (2) the statute has been
construed as being one compelling liability insurance which indemni-
fies against liability and not simply indemnifies against loss; (3) the
statute has been construed as being one for the benefit of the injured
party and the public generally thereby conferring upon the injured
party a beneficial interest in the contract sufficient to provide privity
of contract between the insurer and the injured party; (4) damages
claimed are actual damages only and not punitive damages thus
affecting all parties to the action, and (5) in South Carolina courts,
damages claimed are not in excess of policy limitations, or if in ex-
70. Cons oF LAws or S. C. § 10-702 (1952).
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cess, the circumstances are such that it is easily ascertainable how
an allocation between insurer and insured can be made, or, in federal
courts in South Carolina, actual damages claimed are not in excess
of policy limitations.
A. C. CLARKSON, JR.
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